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our foreign policy dictates that investment should be encouraged,
whereas taxes imposed on income from other areas should be handled
by the deduction approach. 74 Thus the loss of revenue through investment in heavily industrialized areas (with stable governments and
relatively little risk-taking) with high tax rates would end, but there
would exist the flexibility, through treaties, to encourage investment
in underdeveloped areas.
STANLEY L. RUBY

THE FEDERAL CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS STATUTES
AND THE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLE
Three events of recent months have concurred to focus public attention on conflict of interests in the federal service. The most significant of these events is the appointment by President Kennedy of a
committee to inquire into the problems of ethics in government. It
is to be hoped that the projected inquiry will amount to more than a
footnote in a law review article, which seems to have been the fate
of its predecessors.' The most spectacular event was the decision in
the Dixon-Yates case,2 in which the Supreme Court held unenforceable
a government contract because of the dual interests of a government
agent. The least publicized event, yet the one which best indicates
the confusion and uncertainty in this area, arose in the Senate consideration of the President's cabinet, notably Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara. As a condition of committee approval, Mr. McNamara
was forced to sell all his interests in the Ford Motor Company so as to
avoid violating any conflict of interest statute. 3 The proposal to place
74. If the credit is retained, Congress would do well to examine carefully
the "tax-sparing" concept first adopted in the Pakistan Tax Treaty of 1957.
"Tax sparing" refers to tax concession granted through treaties by foreign
countries to encourage certain activities. The result for a United States taxpayer is credit through the treaty provision for a tax not paid to the foreign
country. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Surrey is on record as firmly
opposing the concept. Surrey, The Pakistan Tax Treaty and Tax Sparing,
11 NAT'L TAX J. 156 (1958). But see Rev. Rul. 56-635, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 501.
1. Though no action was taken on the recommendations resulting from

earlier investigations, the reports are nonetheless valuable studies of the
problem. The best source in this respect is the report of the subcommittee
headed by Senator Paul Douglas: SUBCOMM. OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
WELFARE, 82D CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON ETHICAL STANDARDS IN GOVERNMENT
(1951). See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION,

pts. III-V (Comm. Print 1958).

2. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961),
reversing 175 F. Supp. 505 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
3. Precedent for requiring disclosure of financial interests by appointees
subject to Senate confirmation is considerable. The requirement of disclosure
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the receipts of the sale in a trust for investment purposes was unacceptable. Eventually, the appointee agreed to make any disposition
of his interests which the committee deemed suitable.
Popular awareness of the conflict of interest 4 problem is significant
and interesting. Conflict of interest has been said to be a "luxury
issue,"'5 a matter that only a secure and stable society can afford to
be concerned about. Certainly the present-day citizen has little to
worry about in comparison with his earlier counterpart. Larcenies
in government are no longer so blatantly gross as they were in earlier
periods of our history. Most commentators agree that the basic
integrity of federal government employees and officials today is relatively high and that the standards are rising. One writer argues, however, that the trend is downward. While noting that few can make
a fortune nowadays, he feels that thousands can and do wrest something less than that from the government and deplores the present
day "democratization of corruption." 6 Assuming the trend to be upward, it should be realized nonetheless that we are living in the
1960's, not a hundred years past, and that the need for high standards
of integrity has grown faster than any coordinate rise in ethical standards generally.
This note will relate and compare common law fiduciary principles
of interests or transfer as in the case of Mr. McNamara, while having no
statutory basis, is the most spectacular participation of Congress in the area
of executive conflict of interests. The public mind probably identifies the
restrictions imposed by these confirming committees with conflict of interest
regulation more than in any other publicized situation. The earliest example
of such Senate action occurred in 1925 when Mr. Charles Warren, President
Coolidge's nominee for Attorney General, was rejected by one vote after
refusing to dispose of the interest under dispute. The best known example
is that of Mr. Charles E. Wilson who was confirmed as Secretary of Defense
after disposing of his stock in General Motors.
4. Relatively little has been written in this field and consequently the pertinent law is not well known. The most recent and best work in the field is
a study made by the New York City Bar, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE (1960), hereinafter cited as BAR STUDY. For general treatments of the subject see Davis,
The Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (1954); McElwain
& Vorenburg, The Federal Conflict of Interest Statutes, 65 HARv. L. REV. 955
(1952). See also STAFF OF SUBcOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., 2D SESs., REPORT ON FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LEGISLATION,

pts. I-II (Comm. Print 1958); Eisenberg, Conflicts of Interest Situations and
Remedies, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 666 (1958); Dembling & Forrest, Government
Service and Private Compensation, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (1951). For
discussion of the problem in regard to municipal corporations see Eisenberg,

supra; Kaplan & Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interests: Inconsistencies and
Patchwork Prohibitions, 58 CoLun.

L. REV. 157 (1958); Lillich, Municipal

Conflict of Interest: Rights and Remedies Under an Invalid Contract, 27
FORDHAm L. REV. 31 (1959); Note, Conflict-of-Interests of Government Personnel: An Appraisal of the Philadelphia Situation, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 985
(1959); Note, The Doctrine of Conflicting Interests Applied to Municipal Officials in New Jersey, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 582 (1958).
5. BAR STUDY 6.
6. BOLLES, How

To GET RICH IN WASHINGTON 4 (1952).
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to conflict of interest situations. Of necessity such a project must be
general in nature. Therefore no attempt will be made to correlate the
many aspects of the conflicts question to the various theories of trusts,
agency, and so forth. Three situations will be considered: (1) acceptance of compensation from private sources for government related
services; (2) post-employment activities; and (3) the transaction of
business with entities in which a personal interest is held. These situations will be examined first in relation to the pertinent federal
statutes, then each will be considered in relation to applicable fiduciary principles. The basic policies underlying this area and how well
they have been fulfilled will thus be brought to light.
The problem of conflict of interest evolved along with man's capacity for rational thought. Even before Christ warned against attempting to serve two masters, 7 Plato had forbidden his philosopher
8
kings to hold any personal economic interests whatsoever. In this
country the problem was recognized early when the first Congress
prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from investing in government securities. 9 At various times, usually during or after periods of
national peril, the problem has risen from its dormant state to shock
and disillusion the public and to embarrass the administration in
power. The periodic changes in administrations, accompanied by all
the political overtones, aggravates the problem. It ofttimes seems that
the situation is no more serious at one time than another, but that
the cover is lifted and the rottenness exposed only when most expedient.
The particular federal statutes to be examined have been selected
partly because of general interest and partly because of their value in
pointing up certain fiduciary principles. These statutes cover the three
areas of conflict of interest mentioned above. Four of the statutes deal
with the acceptance of compensation from private sources for government related services; two relate to post-employment activities; the
last prohibits a government official from acting for the government in
transactions with a business entity in which he has an interest. Four
of these statutes were enacted in the mid-nineteenth century, and
their historical background helps to place the entire problem in perspective.
Public morality in the mid-1800's was low. Under Jackson's spoils
system, each new administration brought into office masses of untrained political appointees. The concept of the professional "public
servant" was unheard of while blatant self-dealing was the order of
7. Matt. 6:24.
8. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 543.
9. 1 Stat. 67 (1789), as amended,
(1958).

REV. STAT.

§ 243 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 243

1488

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 14

the day. But conscious wrongdoing was not the only problem. Among
men of the highest motives there was disagreement over what could
and what could not be done. Perhaps the best example of the contemporary standards of the day is given by the correspondence between Senator Daniel Webster and Nicholas Biddle, President of the
Bank of the United States. In October, 1833, Webster suggested in a
"private" letter that Biddle might wish the Senator to bring before
Congress the matter of President Jackson's proposed withdrawal of
United States' deposits from the bank. A later letter shows that
Webster's interest was more than political:
Sir: Since I have arrived here, I have had an application to be concerned
professionally, against the Bank, which I have declined, of course, although I believe my retainer has not been renewed, or refreshed as usual.
If it be wished that my relation to the Bank should be continued, it may
be well to send me the usual retainer.10
Self-dealing took many forms. It was a common thing for members
of Congress to be paid for appearing as counsel before the Supreme
Court, other courts, or federal agencies, representing parties having
claims against the government. Claims were handled by private act
of Congress or by the particular department involved. These departmental claims were frequently conducted ex parte with no elements
of an adversary proceeding. The advocates of the system found historical support for their activities. Representative Stephens of Georgia
noted that "such a connection has never been deemed improper, that
there is no legislation against it .... The position of General Jackson,
and of the party then in power... was, that there was no law against
it .... ,,l
The spoils system and the indifferent claims procedure created
serious enough problems in time of peace. In time of war the two
systems in combination produced outright fraud, dishonesty, and theft.
The history of military procurement frauds during the Civil War is
familiar. 12 So grave was the problem that the New York, Ohio, and
Michigan legislatures requested Congress to act so as to prevent
13
speculation and frauds in providing supplies for the federal armies.
Congress responded with the first conflict of interests statutes.
10. Letters from Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle, October 29, 1833, De-

cember 21, 1833, in MCGRANE, THE CORRESPONDENCE or
218 (1919).
11. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 289-90 (1853).

12. See, e.g., RANDALL,
13. BAR STUDY 36.

NICHOLAS BIDDLE

THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1937).

216-17,
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I. PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR GOVERNMENT RELATED SERVICES

A. 18 U.S.C. § 283: UncompensatedAssistance to Claimants
The principal, and perhaps basic, instance of conflict of interests is
the acceptance of compensation from private sources for government
related services. Activities encompassed within this area involve the
myriad uses of influence and position to obtain special privilege or
gain. A bill passed in 1853, entitled "An Act to Prevent Frauds in the
Treasury of the United States," contained the predecessor of section
283, the oldest of the statutes on conflict of interests. Of the eight
sections of the original omnibus bill, only section 2 appears in the
present law.
The section is succinct. 14 It is directed at the government officer
who works for the government and simultaneously works against it
by assisting others in their claims against the United States. In essence, section 283 prohibits a government employee from assisting or
acting as agent or attorney in the prosecution of any claim against the
United States. This particular statute, unlike later enactments, is
applicable whether or not the employee receives compensation for
services rendered, though it also forbids the receipt of any gratuity or
interest in a claim in return for assisting in prosecuting it. A section
of the original statute included in its scope members of Congress; this
was repealed in 1873.15 The statute is restricted to "claims" against
the United States. A court construing similar language in a similar
statute held that a "claim" was limited to demands for money or
property.' 6 "Prosecution," however, is broadly defined as including
not only prosecutions at law, but also all activities that aim at the
affirmance or collection of a claim.17 Though over a hundred years
old, only a few cases and a few opinions of the Attorney General have
arisen under the statute. Section 283 is a sweeping statement of
policy, applicable to all employees of the executive branch alike, striking with criminal sanctions at abuses of government prevalent in the
nineteenth century.
14. The statute now reads:
"Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or any
department or agency thereof, or of the Senate or House of Representatives, acts as an agent or attorney for prosecuting any claim against the
United States, or aids or assists in the prosecution or support of any such
claim otherwise than in the proper discharge of his official duties, or
receives any gratuity, or any share of or any interest in any such claim in
consideration of assistance in the prosecution of such claim, shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
18 U.S.C. § 283 (1958).
15. 10 Stat. 170 (1853).
16. United States v. Bergson, 119 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1954).
17. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 283 (1950).
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B. 18 U.S.C. § 281: CompensatedAssistance to Others in
Executive Forum
A statute similar to section 283 in scope and application was enacted
in 186418 and is now contained in section 281 of title 18.19 This section
again is designed to prevent government employees from assisting
outsiders in their dealings with the government. Section 281, however,
is broader than section 283 in two respects. (1) Its prohibition extends
far beyond assisting in "claims." (2) The employee is forbidden to
render services in relation to any matter in which the United States
is a party or is directly or indirectly interested. Moreover, it includes
members of Congress. Section 281 is narrower, however, than section
283 in that it forbids only services rendered for compensation.2 0 And
it applies only to the proceedings or matters enumerated in the statute
which, oddly enough, do not include court proceedings. 2 1 Actual services must be rendered,22 but any activity, though normal and customary, may be sufficient. 23 The necessity for the 1864 enactment is
not clear; it overlaps the earlier law considerably. Apparently the
abuses had continued or grown worse with the war, and Congress was
spurred to some sort of action.
Section 281, the most litigated of the laws on conflict of interest, has
been called the keystone of the statutes in this field. But in its ninety
and more years of existence, only ten cases have been reported along
with some opinions by the Attorney General. Two cases which indi24
cate the scope of the statute are noteworthy. United States v. Quinn
held the statute to be violated if the government employee receives
income, with knowledge of its source, arising from activities proscribed but performed solely by his nongovernmental partner. This
decision particularly affects the legal profession. The other case,
Burton v. United States,25 held that the government may be "directly
18. 13 Stat. 123 (1864).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 281 (1958) reads as follows:
"Whoever, being a Member of or Delegate to Congress, or a Resident
Commissioner, either before or after he has qualified, or the head of a
department, or other officer or employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, directly or indirectly receives or agrees to
receive, any compensation for any services rendered or to be rendered,
either by himself or another, in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim,
controversy, charge, accusation, arrest or other matter in which the United
States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any department, agency, court-martial, officer, or any civil, military or naval commission shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the United States."
20. United States v. Booth, 148 Fed. 112 (C.C.D. Ore. 1906).
21. United States v. Adams, 115 F. Supp. 731 (D.N.D. 1953).
22. United States v. Reisley, 35 F. Supp. 102 (D.N.J. 1940).
23. United States v. Booth, 148 Fed. 112 (C.C.D. Ore. 1906).
24. 141 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
25. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
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or indirectly" interested according to section 281 though the United
States has no pecuniary interest in the matter. Section 281, all in all,
has a broader impact than section 283.
C. 18 U.S.C. § 216: Compensation for Assistance in Procurement
of Government Contracts
In 1862, after a full year of continuous investigations and scandals
concerning procurement contracts, Congress enacted an unworkable
statute2 requiring each War, Navy, and Interior contract to be filed in
a special office along with an affidavit from the contracting officer
that he had made the contract fairly and without corrupt influence.
The needs of war made necessary an almost immediate suspension of
the act.27 A day earlier, however, a more general criminal statute became effective.2 This statute was the parent of the present section
216,29 which specifically forbids a government employee from receiving payment for procuring, or assisting to procure, a government
contract. Moreover it provides for penalties against those persons
who make such payments. Applicable to contracts only, the statute
covers members of Congress, as well as executive personnel. The
President is authorized to void any contract arising from a violation
of this statute.
It is to be noted that section 216 is both a conflict of interest statute
and a bribery statute. As to those employees whose official duties
relate to the contracting process, section 216 supplements the general
bribery statutes. There has been little litigation under this law. Because of the blanketing affect of section 281 and the general bribery
statutes, section 216 has been neither a source of trouble nor assistance
in the area of governmental ethics.
D. 18 U.S.C. § 1914: Outside Compensation
The fourth statute considered in this problem area does not share
26.
27.
28.
29.

12 Stat. 412 (1862).
12 Stat. 600 (1862).
12 Stat. 577 (1862).
The statute now reads as follows:
'"hoever being a Member of or Delegate to Congress, or a Resident
Commissioner, either before or after he has qualified, or being an officer,
employee, or agent of the United States directly or indirectly takes, receives, or agrees to receive, any money or thing of value, for giving,
procuring or aiding to procure to or for any person, any contract from
the United States or from any officer, department or agency thereof; or

"Whoever, directly or indirectly, offers, gives, or agrees to give any

money or thing of value for procuring or aiding to procure any such
contract"Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both; and be disqualified from holding any office of honor, profit,
or trust under the United States.
"The President may declare void any such contract or agreement." 18
U.S.C. § 216 (1958).
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the historical prestige of its fellow statutes. Its history and objectives
vary considerably from earlier enactments. Though passed in the year
1917, section 1914 was not an outcrop of World War I. The statute was

designed to restrict the activities of dollar-a-year employees of the
Bureau of Education. Apparently, some sort of alliance had been

effected between the Bureau and certain private organizations, notably the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations, for the purpose of
studying and promoting such projects as Negro education and kindergarten programs.30 This was too much for the opponents of national
interference in educational policy; the result was a bill with sweeping

provisions.
Essentially, section 1914 provides that no private entity is to pay
a government employee for performing his governmental duties. The
wording is rather peculiar. 3' The first paragraph prohibits the receipt
of any "salary" by an employee other than his government pay. The
second paragraph forbids any non-governmental source to make a
"contribution" for the services performed by the employee in his
official capacity. The statute excepts payments received from state
and local government sources and is implemented by criminal sanctions. Section 1914 is the first statute examined which is, in a technical
sense, a conflict of interest statute. That is, the employee does not
have to act improperly to violate the statute; receipt of outside compensation for his government work plus his status as a federal employee is sufficient.
There are no cases under section 1914, but there are opinions by the
Attorney General and the Comptroller General.m2 While the latter's
views tend to be generally restrictive, the Attorney General seems to
find nothing wrong when the financial arrangement involved is not
harmful to the United States. Because no wrongdoing is necessary
for its violation, this section contains inherent difficulties of application and enforcement. Moreover, it is clearly questionable on policy
grounds in that it cuts off a fertile source of good men for federal service.
30. See

BAR

STUDy 54.

31. 18 U.S.C. § 1914 (1958) reads as follows:

"Whoever, being a government official or employee, receives any salary
in connection with his services as such an officer or employee from any
source other than the government of the United States, except as may be
contributed out of the treasury of any State, county or municipality; or
"Whoever, whether a person, association, or corporation, makes any
contribution to, or in any way supplements the salary of, any government

official or employee for the services performed by him for the government
of the United States"Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than six
months, or both."
32. See, e.g., 33 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 273 (1922); 37 DECS. COMP. GEN. 776 (1958).
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II. POST-EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
A. 5 U.S.C. § 99: The Civil Post-Employment Statute
It was only a matter of time until it became obvious that the legislation related to the assistance of outside claimants, sections 281 and
283, was inadequate. The aid that a government employee was forbidden to render while an employee became legal upon termination
of the employment status. Hence, without supplemental legislation
directed at post-employment activities, much of the effect of the
earlier law was negated. Consequently, in 1872, Congress passed a
law33 which forbade an employee of an executive department to act
as counsel, or agent, for a period of two years after leaving office, in
the prosecution of claims pending in a department while he was in
office. The provisions of this statute are now embodied in section 99

of title 5.34
Passage of the bill was preceded by considerable debate. The more
important issues discussed involved who should be included; for
what period of time should the activities be proscribed; should the
law extend to all claims, claims pending only in the employee's department while he was in service, or only those on which he had
worked; what sanctions should be imposed. In answering these questions, the ultimate wording of the statute was determined by three
main objectives: (1) the desire to protect the government from
fraudulent claims; (2) the desire to save money and to stop the switching of sides; and (3) the desire to avoid the evil of continuing personal
influence in government. A conflicting attitude, manifest in 1872, and
not yet dead and buried, was that governmental service was "demeaning," that if an employee "can gain a more independent livelihood by
the use of the knowledge which he acquired in government employ . . . , one person at least would be saved from its pernicious
influence."35
The most interesting facet of section 99 is that it has no provision
for punishment for its violation. It was thought then, as some think
now, that the panacea for the evils in government service lay in the
"integrity and intelligence" of the employees themselves. One senator remarked that he could not envision an official acting "in the face
33. 17 Stat. 202 (1872).

34. The section now reads:
"It shall not be lawful for any person appointed as an officer, clerk, or
employee in any of the departments to act as counsel, attorney, or agent
for prosecuting any claim against the United States which was pending in
either of said departments while he was such officer, clerk or employee,
nor in any manner, nor by any means, to aid in the prosecution of any
such claim, within two years next after he shall have ceased to be such
officer, clerk, or employee."

35.

BAR STUDY

47.

REv. STAT. § 190

(1875), 5 U.S.C. § 99 (1958).
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of an official pronouncement of illegality."3 6 The original phrasing
of section 99 seemed clearly to forbid the officer's participation only
when the claim involved had been pending in that officer's particular
department. When the amended version came out in 1874, its scope
was less clear than that of its ancestor. The accepted interpretation
now is that the prohibition extends to the ex-officer's participation in
37
a claim pending before any department while he was in office.
Coverage of the statute, in view of present day governmental structure, is absurd. The language includes only "departments," impliedly
excluding agencies. This arises, of course, from the fact that when the
section was enacted, no independent federal agencies existed. When
the question arose in 1903 as to whether agencies were included, the
Attorney General answered that "department" means "department."3 8
There are no federal cases under section 99. However, in three state
cases, a violation of the statute has been asserted as a ground for holding a contract unenforceable. In two of the cases the court implied
that a violation of the statute would render unenforceable a contract
based on such violation, but the holdings were limited in that the
claims involved had never reached the required adjectival status of
"pending."3 9
B. 18 U.S.C. § 284: The CriminalPost-EmpZoyment Statute
Immediately after World War I, the federal government was besieged with contract claims, many being prosecuted by former military
officers. Secretary of War Newton Baker sought an interpretation
from the Attorney General that such officers were within the scope of
section 99. The Attorney General, however, was of the opinion that
"an officer of the United States Army is not by virtue of that fact
4
alone in the Department of War within the meaning of" section 99. 0
The Secretary then turned to the Congress, and that body responded
with a new statute designed to supplement section 99.41 This legislation
fell far short of the need, but it did serve to draw the attention of
Congress to the inadequacies of section 99. Nevertheless, recommendations of congressional committees resulted in no further action until
1942.
Upon the outbreak of World War II, section 99 operated as a bar to
36. Ibid.
37. 20 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 696 (1894).
38. 25 Ors. ATT'Y GEN. 6 (1903).

39. See Day v. Laguna Land & Water Co., 115 Cal. App. 221, 1 P.2d 448
(Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Ludwig v. Raydure, 25 Ohio App. 293, 157 N.E. 816

(1927); Day v. Gera Mills, 133 Misc. 220, 231 N.Y. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd,
229 App. Div. 771, 242 N.Y.S. 812 (1930).
40. 31 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 471, 474 (1919).

41. 41 Stat. 131 (1914).
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recruitment of personnel for government service. To overcome this

there was attached to the Renegotiation Act of 1942 a rider exempting
employees of certain departments from the restrictions of that
section. 42 There was, however, a counter-proviso that no such employee should ever prosecute a claim against the United States which
arose from any matter with which he was directly connected while in
office. In its ultimate effect, the apparent exemption extended postemployment restrictions beyond a "department" for the first time.
Moreover, it placed emphasis on the direct connection between the
particular officer and the claim. In 1944, the rider to the Renegotiation
Act, after being amended twice, became the predecessor of the present
section 284.4
Section 284 is very similar to section 99, but differs in three respects.
Section 284 provides a criminal penalty; it covers all agencies of the
federal government; and it tests the claim included in its coverage by
the direct relationship of the officer to the claim. There is little case
law under section 284. In United States v. Bergson,44 the court held

that the term "claim" was limited to actions to recover money or
property from the United States. This would seem to say that an
ex-officer could act as counsel in a case arising from the refusal to
pay taxes, but that he would be barred from so acting in a suit to
recover taxes paid under protest. Whether the restriction of section
284 extends to the partners of a covered ex-officer is not clear, nor is
the scope of the phrase "subject matter directly connected with which"
the former employee was "employed or performed duty." There are
no cases on this point but a case arising under the Canons of Professional Ethics offers an interesting analogy. This case, United States v.
Standard Oil Co.,45 will be discussed at length below.
III. BusINEss

TRANSACTIONS WITH ENTITIES IN WHICH THE EMPLOYEE

HOLDS A PERSONAL INTEREST

A. 18 U.S.C. § 434: Disqualification
The last area of conflict of interests to be considered involves only
one statute, section 434 of title 18. This section's predecessor was
42. 56 Stat. 982, 985 (1942).

43. 18 U.S.C. § 284 (1958) reads as follows:
'"hoever, having been employed in any agency of the United States,

including commissioned officers assigned to duty in such agency, within
two years after the time such employment has ceased, prosecutes or acts
as counsel, attorney, or agent for prosecuting, any claims against the
United States involving any subject matter directly connected with which
such person was so employed or performed duty, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
44. 119 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1954).
45. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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enacted in 1863 and was a product of the wartime procurement frauds
noted earlier. There is almost no legislative history to this section
but it is clear that it was designed to meet the matter of dual interests
which had been brought to the attention of Congress. Section 434,
since its inception, has been unique in its method of regulation. This
section, like section 1914, is a true conflict of interest statute and is
perhaps the best example of this type statute in the books.46
Rather than restrict what an employee does outside his official
capacity, section 434 operates as a bar beyond which a government
employee is forbidden to act in an official capacity, In substance the
statute prohibits an employee from acting as an officer or agent for
the government in the transaction of business with any business entity
in which he holds a direct or indirect interest. In effect, section 434
is a disqualification statute; it does not forbid the outside interest,
contrary to much popular thinking, but requires the government employee to refrain from acting for the government with the entity in
which the interest is held.
Before 1961, only six cases had been reported under section 434.47
In January of this year the Supreme Court gave the widest possible
operative force to section 434 in reversing the Court of Claims in the
celebrated Dixon-Yates case. 4 8 The decision marked the end of a prolonged game of political football.
The case arose out of a situation wherein the federal government
was pressed with increased demands for electrical power facilities.
President Eisenhower had expressed the administration's preference
for private, as opposed to public, facilities. Pursuant to this expressed
preference, the government entered negotiations with Dixon-Yates,
the sponsor-predecessor of the plaintiff contractor, in an attempt to
reach agreement on proposals upon which a contract could be based.
Specifically as an expert in money costs, and generally as an expediter
of the negotiations, the government utilized Adolphe Wenzell, an
employee of First Boston Corporation, a large investment firm which
had handled the financing of the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation
some years earlier. The Bureau of the Budget, which had requested
Wenzell's aid, and the Tennessee Valley Authority were aware of
46. 18 U.S.C. § 434 (1958) reads as follows:
"Whoever, being an officer, agent or member of, or directly or indirectly
interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of any corporation, jointstock company, or association, or of any firm, or partnership, or other
business entity, is employed or acts as an officer or agent of the United
States for the transaction of business with such business entity, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both."
47. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 434 (1950).
48. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961),
reversing 175 F. Supp. 505 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
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Wenzell's principal employment as a director and vice-president of
First Boston and that the final contractor might well select First
Boston to finance the project. First Boston continued to pay Wenzell's
salary; he received only per diem expenses from the government.
Wenzell owned no stock in and was never employed by Dixon-Yates.
However, he did receive a commission on any business he brought to
First Boston. At one stage of the proceedings, Wenzell was advised
by counsel for Dixon-Yates to withdraw from the negotiations. This
warning was brushed aside by the Director of the Budget and Wenzell
continued to render services. After weeks of negotiation and shortly
after Wenzell had terminated his relationship with the government,
proposals were submitted which eventually resulted in a fair, goodfaith contract, a point conceded by the government in the later litigation. First Boston was selected by the contractor to finance sixty
per cent of the project but declined to accept a fee. The contract was
cancelled almost immediately, but not before substantial costs were
incurred. Upon suit for these costs, the government defended on the
ground that Wenzell's activities rendered the contract unenforceable
because of his dual interests. This argument, rejected by a three-two
decision in the Court of Claims, was accepted by a divided Supreme
Court.
Several aspects of the case are worthy of note. The statute, the
Court said, was not limited to the higher echelons of government,
or only to those having a direct financial interest in the business
entity, or to a narrow class of business transactions. "Rather, it applies, without exception to 'whoever' is 'directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary profits or contracts of a business entity with
which he transacts any business as an officer or agent of the United
States.'"49 Further, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
contract ultimately negotiated is immaterial. The statute does not require corruption or that there be any "actual loss suffered by the government ....
The statute is thus directed not only at dishonor, but
also at conduct that tempts dishonor ....
[I]t is more concerned with
what might have happened in a given situation then with what actually happened." 50 Wenzell's efforts and activities as a negotiator wete
held to be the "transaction of business" within the meaning of the
statute. And the Court found that Wenzell had an indirect interest in
the contract, a bit tenuous perhaps, but nonetheless an interest:
[I]f a contract . . . was ultimately agreed upon, there was a substantial
probability that, because of its prior experience in the area of private
power financing, First Boston would be hired to secure the financing for
49. 364 U.S. at 549.
50. Id. at 549-50.

1498

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 14

the proposed Memphis project; if First Boston did receive the [financing]
contract, it might not only profit directly from that contract, but it would
also achieve great prestige and would thereby be likely to receive other
business of the same kind in the future; therefore, Wenzell . . . could
expect to benefit from any agreement that might be made .... 51
Finally, while it appears that Congress can impliedly authorize activities which would otherwise be forbidden by section 434,52 the knowledge and approval of the employee's superiors is not sufficient to
legitimize the employee's activities. Few would argue that Wenzell
could be convicted in a criminal action brought under this statute, and
this is the most striking fact concerning section 434. In its ninetyseven years on the books, which period included five wars, not a single
person has been convicted of its violation. The statute has only been
used for rendering government contracts unenforceable and, until
now, it has not been effective even in that respect.
The decision of the Court could hardly have been any other. But in
view of the secondary policy underlying the conflict of interest problem, that is, the desire for effective recruitment of competent personnel, was the decision a wise one? A cautious man might view the
prospect of government service with alarm. It might fairly be said
of Dixon-Yates that the government requested the aid of a man expert
in his field; this man did his job in good faith; upon inquiry he was
told by his superior that his activities were proper; subsequently the
Supreme Court determined that his activities violated a criminal
statute for which the expert could have been indicted, convicted, and
imprisoned. The impact of this decision on many honest but cautious
men can be measured only by future events.
B. Exemptions: An Additional ComplicatingFactor
In order to evaluate the statutes as a whole it is important that
attention be focused on the fact that there are exemptions to their
provisions. These exemptions have been used as a ground for attacking the statutes as inadequate. 53 Three broad categories are to be
noted. The first category of exemption is contained in the statute itself. Sections 281 and 283 exclude from their coverage members of
the National Guard of the District of Columbia and partially exclude
retired officers of the Armed Forces. A second type exemption is the
"spot" type. Congress recognized early that the inflexibility of the
statutes made them unworkable in regard to intermittent employees
and certain government positions. 54 The last type exemption is found
51. Id. at 555. (Emphasis added.)
52. Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1944).
53. See Davis, The Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, 54 COLUm. L. REV. 893,
911 (1954).
54. For examples of these "spot" type exemptions, see BAR STUDY 67 n.97.
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in the "emergency" category. In time of national crises, the statutes
have been stretched, ignored, or avoided by exemption. A few such
exemptions are currently on the books.55 These statutes vary according to a number of factors: the seriousness of the crisis; the particular
programs involved; availability of trained personnel; the employment
status of the employee, whether a W.O.C. (without compensation
employee), expert, or consultant; and the current political atmosphere
with respect to government ethics in general.
[I]t is sufficient for the general observer to know that there are some
statutory exceptions from the conflict of interest laws, that there are not
very many of them, that their provisions are highly technical .. . [and]
erratic .... To some government appointees these exemptions are of
vital concern, to the lawyers asked to track down and construe them, a
source of despair.56

IV. THE PUBLIC OFFICER AS A FIDUCIARY
It would be superfluous to criticize to any greater extent the statutes
considered above. This has been done before, 57 and substantial changes
in this area of the law seem imminent. What is needed is a basis in
principle from which a statutory framework could be constructed to
bring order into this chaotic area. Such a basis is to be found in the
general rules applicable to fiduciaries. "A fiduciary," according to
Professor Austin Scott, "is a person who undertakes to act in the
interest of another person."58 Present day enumerations of fiduciary
relationships generally include trustee and beneficiary, guardian and
ward, agent and principal, attorney and client, executor or administrator and legatees, directors and their corporation, and partner and
partner. To these current lists might well be added the relationship
of public officer and the public. Such a relationship at one time was
high on any list of fiduciaries, the terms "public officer," "agent," and
"trustee" being used almost synonymously. Modern day categorization
and emphasis on doctrine have tended to blunt what formerly was a
sharp and powerful tool in dealing with misbehavior in public office.
The same rule is shared by the American and English courts: A
public officer occupies a position of trust and as such the officer is
bound by the duties of a fiduciary. It is awkward to call it a rule of
law. The early American cases talk of public officer, agent and trustee
in an off-hand manner, and the early English cases use the terms
interchangeably. 59 Eventually, through that process of evolution pecu55. Id. at 67-68.
56. Id. at 69.
57. See materials cited note 4 supra.
58. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. Rxv. 539, 540 (1949).
59. The leading case is York Bldgs. Co. v. Mackenzie, 8 Br. P.C. 42, 3 Eng.
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liar to the common law, the phrase "No man can serve two masters"
became an authoritative rule of law. It is not the intent of the writer
to take issue with so imminent a commentator as the author of that
statement, but it seems that the phrase has been too literally construed.
A more realistic approach is in order. The conflict of interest situation
is inherent in modern government; it can be controlled but not eradicated. The statutes discussed earlier are not helpful in this respect.
They are simply patches cut out of the broad cloth of public policy.
They overlap in certain areas to a great degree while leaving other
important areas quite uncovered. Sometimes the statutes act as
blinders on the court; they fail to see beyond the words of the statute
to the underlying policy.60
What is involved in a conflict of interest situation? Every person's
identity can be said to exist in the relationships of his interests in
persons and things. These interests are more properly called loyalties
and are the ties which relate him to others. When a conflict in these
loyalties presents itself, it is normally a personal matter as to how
the conflict is resolved. The great percentage of these differences are
resolved automatically. Other conflicts, somewhat more serious, are
resolved by conscious choice. While critical loyalty conflicts may
threaten a person's equilibrium, the sorting and sifting of these interrelated loyalties rarely affects the public generally. When, however,
this process becomes a matter of public concern, the thumb of the law
may be put to the scales so as to require the resolution of the loyalty
conflict in a certain way. Such a situation obtains in fiduciary relationships.
One who undertakes to act in the interest of another is a fiduciary.
The energizing force connecting a fiduciary and his principal is a duty
Rep. 432 (H.L. 1795). However, the best statement of the principle is that of
Lord Mansfield in The King v. Bembridge, 3 Doug. 327, 99 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.
1783):

"Here there are two principles applicable: first that a man accepting an
office of trust concerning the public, especially if attended with profit,
is answerable criminally to the king for misbehavior in his office; this is
true, by whomever and in whatever way the officer is appointed ...
Secondly, where there is a breach of trust, fraud, or imposition, in a
matter concerning the public, though as between individuals it would
only be actionable, yet as between the King and the subject it is indictable." 3 Doug. at 332, 99 Eng. Rep. at 681.
The Bembridge case involved a receiver and paymaster general of the armed
forces who wilfully concealed certain shortages in his accounts. Wilfulness
was an essential element of the offense. This was not so in York in which
there was no evidence of fraud or wrongdoing: the sale therein was avoided
solely because of the disability incurred by virtue of the fiduciary capacity of
the common agent who was an officer of the court. It is to be noted that the
York case cites only cases involving fiduciaries other than public officials. See
Keech v. Sandford, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 741, 22 Eng. Rep. 629 (Ch. 1726); Whelpdale v. Cookson, 1 Ves. Sen. 9, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 1747). An excellent
review of authorities is found in Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N.Y. 327 (1860).
60. E.g., see Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1944).
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of loyalty. Some fiduciary duties are more intense than others. The
duty of loyalty imposed is proportional to the independent authority
which the fiduciary may exercise. Thus, a trustee is under a stricter
duty than an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred. Similarly, the head of a governmental agency is bound by a stricter duty
of loyalty than his subordinate. A conflict of loyalty (or interest)
arises when this duty of loyalty is endangered, that is, when a second
loyalty or interest creates a situation in which the fiduciary's primary
duty of loyalty is frustrated or prevented. A public officer, as a fiduciary, owes a primary duty of loyalty to his principal, the public. This
fundamental loyalty should be the touchstone in constructing preventive measures to meet the problem. Further, it is submitted that the
principles applicable to fiduciaries form a ready framework on which
to build.
What are the policies underlying the conflict of interests statutes?
Promoting government efficiency? This is true only in a limited
sense; a corrupt government can be as efficient as an honest one. To
promote public confidence? The confidence of its people is essential
to the survival of any government, but the confidence is directed at
the governmental system, not the system's employees. The American
people are confident of the democratic system, but their distrust of
politicians and public officers is notorious. 61 Two other policies seem
more practical in their objectives: to insure that every citizen is
treated equally and to prevent the use of public office for private gain.
It would seem that the conflicts laws are a preventive device. Thus,
when the public places a man in a position of power, which is peculiarly subject to abuse, the disposition of power must be limited by
certain disabilities.
Are statutes needed? What do statutes add that the common law of
fiduciaries lacks? These questions can best be answered by reference
to the conflict of interest situations previously considered.
A. Compensation From Private Sources for Government Related
Activities
In this problem area, three rules of agency are particularly applicable. First, any one acting as an agent must not use his position for
61. "A recent poll by the National Opinion Research Center disclosed that
five out of every seven Americans believed it impossible for a professional
politician to be honest, and only eighteen per cent of America's parents were
willing to let their sons enter political careers." Becker, Ethics in Public Life
-A Challenge to the Lawyer, 2 DE PAUL L. REV. 194, 204 (1953). Much of the
public seems to have adopted as their own the rationalization of Tammany
chief George Washington Plunkitt, who said, "There is an honest graft and I
am an example of how it works. I might sum up the whole thing by saying,
'I seen my opportunities and I took 'em.'" Quoted in Becker, op. cit. supra
at 199 n.11.
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his own profit, regardless of his motives, and regardless of whether
actual harm is suffered by the principal. Second, if such a fiduciary
does act for his own interests, he holds the profits in trust for his
principal. Last, these profits can be "traced" and recovered from any
third person except a bona fide purchaser. 62 These three rules have
63
found application in a recent English case, Reading v. King.

Reading was a British Army sergeant who took £20,000 in bribes
for escorting smuggled goods through Cairo so as to avoid inspection
by civil authorities. The money was impounded by the military. Upon
suit to recover possession, held, petition dismissed. In holding that the
Crown was entitled to the money, Mr. Justice Denning said:
There are many cases in the books where a master has been held entitled
to the unauthorized gains of his servant or agent. At law, the action
took the form of money had and received. In equity there was said to be
a constructive trust due to a fiduciary relationship. Nowadays it is unnecessary to draw a distinction between law and equity.... The claim
here is for restitution of moneys which in justice, ought to be paid over.
It matters not that the master has not lost any profit, nor suffered any
damage. Nor does it matter that the master could not have done the act
himself. It is a case where the servant has unjustly enriched himself by
virtue of his service without his master's sanction. It is money which
the servant ought not to be allowed to keep, and the law says it shall be
taken from him and given to his master, because he got it solely by reason
of the position which he occupied as servant of his master.64
The United States Supreme Court reached a similar result in a 1910
case. 65 There the defendant was a brilliant and rising army officer
who had been placed in charge of improvements in Savannah Harbor.
The construction company reaped a profit of some two millions, and
the defendant allegedly received one half million of this in exchange

for manipulating contract options and competitive bidding. Using
fiduciary principles, the Court found the defendant a constructive
trustee for the benefit of the government. And though any of several
conflicts of interests statutes would seem appropriate, the Court
made no mention of them at all. The same result has been obtained in
66
several federal and state court cases.

62. See Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in
Public Office, 54 COLum. L. Ray. 214, 215 (1954).
63. [1948] 2 K.B. 268, af'd, [1949] 2 K.B. 232.
64. [1948] 2 K.B. 268 at 275.
65. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910).
66. In United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 55 F.2d 753 (9th Cir.)
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 612 (1932), which arose out of the Teapot Dome scandals,
the Court said that
"when [Secretary of the Interior] Fall accepted the 'loan' . . . he became
thereafter incapable of properly representing the United States in any
dealings with his benefactor. The fact that the defrauded principal occasionally may be benefited by certain transactions entered into in his name
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There is no reason why the above statement of principles should not
apply to situations arising under the conflict of interest statutes. In
Reading the money was obtained from bribes, but the principles are
applicable in cases where so blatant an offense is not involved. Note
the following observation by Professor Scott:
The conduct of the fiduciary may involve a violation of his duty of
loyalty where he receives some benefit for himself, even though it does not
concern something so crass as a bribe. This is the case, for example, where
he receives a commission in connection with what is otherwise a perfectly
proper business transaction entered into by him on behalf of the principal.
Thus a fiduciary has been held accountable for commissions which he
received

. . .

in buying or selling or insuring property of the trust. It is

have been payable to a
immaterial that the same commission would
67
third person acting as such broker or agent.
The third fiduciary principle mentioned earlier-that profits realized
by an agent through a breach of loyalty can be traced and recovered
from takers with knowledge of such breach-is a powerful tool. Mr.
Harold L. Ickes' observation that he had "never known a public official
to corrupt himself" 68 must be conceded to have a large measure of
truth. A public servant may not take the initiative in a corrupt
scheme, but he may well acquiesce in it, especially where the scheme
is so designed that no actual harm is experienced by the government.
It is paradoxical that public indignation and judicial sanction should
concentrate on the public official, while ignoring the equally guilty
private party. Tracing and recovering corrupt profits from the private
party would be a powerful remedy to official wrongdoing. This is
the sort of tool that courts will wield effectively once it is placed in
their hands by competent lawyers. Since in all cases the private corrupter has actual or constructive knowledge of the officials' status and
authority, which prevents his taking in good faith, it would be almost
by the disloyal agent does not deprive the principal of his right to repudiate the bargain."
Similar phraseology was used in an earlier case, United States v. Mammoth
Oil Co., 14 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 13 (1927):
"If a government official, engaged in making contracts for the government, receives pecuniary favor from one with whom such contracts are
made, a fraud is committed on the government, and it matters not that
the government is subjected to no pecuniary loss, or that the contract
might have been an advantageous one to it. The entire transaction is
tainted with favoritism, collusion, and corruption, defeating the proper
and lawful function of the government ....

Nothing is so essential to

the perpetuity of representative government as fidelity of public officials.
That the highest degree of fairness and honesty is required of them goes
without saying, and the same standards apply to those with whom they
deal." 14 F.2d at 717.
See also Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d 8 (1955); City of Boston
v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 30 N.E.2d 278 (1940).
67. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 546 (1949).
68. Quoted in DOUGLAS, ETmIcs IN GOVERNMENT 23 (1952).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1504

[ VoL. 14

impossible to defend an action in restitution successfully. 69
B. Post-EmploymentActivities
The issue in this problem area is whether the duty of loyalty once
established ends with the termination of the fiduciary relationship
or whether the duty has a continuing operative force for certain
purposes. A situation closely analogous to this arises where the
fiduciary takes advantage of confidential information obtained by
virtue of his fiduciary status. 70 The general rule controlling in both
situations finds expression in canons 36 and 37 of The American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics:
36.... A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while
in such office or employ.
37. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidence. This
duty outlasts the lawyers' employment, and extends as well to his em-

ployees ....

71

The principle is found again in the Restatement of Agency.7 2 It applies
not only to agents and attorneys but also to trustees, corporate officers
and other fiduciaries. So also does it apply to former public officers
who have occasion to render service to private interests in regard
to matters with which they dealt as government employees. The best
illustration of this situation arose in United States v. Standard Oil
Co. 3
The federal government had instituted suit against Standard Oil in
an attempt to recover alleged over-charges on oil purchased by the
government under the Marshall Plan in Europe at prices greater than
the limits established by the Economic Cooperation Administration.
ECA price regulation was administered at Washington while the
direct operations were a function of the Paris office. For all practical
purposes the two offices were independent. Among counsel for Standard Oil was a former ECA employee who had worked in the Paris
office. No conflict of interest statutes were applicable because of a
two year time lapse. The lawyer became a partner while the litigation
was in process. When the case came on for trial the government
69. See Lenhoff, supra note 62.
70. There are a few federal statutes relating to the disclosure of confidential
information which were not used in this article. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1958) contains a general prohibition of disclosing confidential information. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1906-08 (1958) contain specific prohibitions.
71. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCEs 35-36 (1957).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY

73. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

§ 395 (1958).
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moved that Standard's counsel be disqualified because of his former
employment with ECA, the basis of the motion being the professional
canons quoted above. Since the evidence showed that the lawyer had
not in fact had any personal contact with the case while working for
ECA, the issue became one of imputing the acts and knowledge of the
employees of the Washington office to those of the Paris office. If the
lawyer was disqualified it was clear that his firm was disqualified also.
The court took a realistic approach and refused to impute the knowledge. The court distinguished between what it called the "vertical"
and "horizontal" theories of imputation of knowledgeJ 4 While knowledge of a subordinate will be imputed readily to a superior, such is
not the case as regards imputation between officials of coordinate
rank and function.
The force of the principle embodied in these canons was ably expressed by Judge Weinfeld in a leading case: 75
A lawyer's duty of absolute loyalty to his client's interest does not
end with his retainer. He is enjoined for all time, except as he may be
released by law, from disclosing matters revealed to him by reason of the
confidential relationship. Related to this principle is the rule that where
any substantial relationshipcan be shown between the subject matter of
a former representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation,
the latter will be prohibited.
[T]he former client need show no more than that the matters embraced
within the pending suit wherein his former attorney appears on behalf
of his adversary are substantially related to the matters or cause of action
wherein the attorney previously represented . . . the former client. The
Court will assume that during the course of the former representation
confidences were disclosed to the attorney bearing on the subject matter
of the representation.76
It may safely be said that in the area of post-employment activities,
the conflict of interests statutes add very little that the law of fiduciaries does not already cover rather effectively.
C. Business Transactions With Entities in Which the Employee Holds
a PersonalInterest
At the common law a fiduciary was forbidden to have a personal
interest in the business transactions conducted for his principal. Or,
if he had a personal interest in a business entity, he suffered a legal
disability to transact business with such entity. The rule varied as
to whether consummated transactions were void or only voidable. The
situation to which this rule applies is the most clear cut in the conflict
74. Id. at 362.
75. T.C. & Theater Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
76. 113 F. Supp. at 268. (Emphasis added.)
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of interest field. Its history is ancient and may be traced to the Roman
civil law. The earliest case found involving a public official or employee is York Building Co. v. Mackenzie.7
The defendant in Mackenzie was a common agent, a solicitor in
court employed by creditors of a bankrupt estate. In the process of
satisfying the creditors by sale of the estate, the defendant made
purchases of the bankrupt's property which were confirmed by order
of court. Eleven years later, after defendant had expended large
sums on improvements and when the property value had greatly increased, the bankrupt's successors in interest sought to have the sale
set aside on the grounds of fraud and that defendant, because of his
capacity as common agent, was disabled from making a valid purchase.
The court held the sale to be
void and null, because the respondent, from his office of common agent,
was under a disability and incapacity, which precluded him from being
the purchaser. The office infers a natural disability of which ex vi
termini imports the highest quality of legal disability. A law which flows
from nature, and is founded in the reason and nature of the thing, is
paramount to all positive law.... [I]t is the constitution of nature itself,
and is as old as the formation of society, and of course it must be universal. It proceeds from nature, and is silently received, recognized, and
made effectual wherever any well regulated system of civil jurisprudence
is known.78

Mackenzie is apparently the first case to treat public officers in the
same manner as other fiduciaries. In earlier cases a public office was
treated as a position of trust,79 but Mackenzie drew no distinction at
all in trustees and public officers. Significantly, the cases cited for
authority in Mackenzie all concern trustees rather than public offi-

cers.

0

The United States Supreme Court in Michoud v. Girod81 followed
the propositions laid down in Mackenzie. The case involved a private
agent, but the Court in a dictum noted that "the general rule stands
upon our great moral obligation to refrain from placing ourselves in
relations which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and
integrity. It restrains all agents, public and private .... ,,82 The doc-

States83
trine suffered a temporary set back in Muschany v. United
84
but was vigorously reasserted in the Dixon-Yates case.
77. 8 Br. P.C. 42, 3 Eng. Rep. 432 (H.L. 1795).
78. 3 Eng. Rep. at 445.

79. King v. Bembridge, 3 Doug. 327, 99 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B. 1783).

80. Keech v. Sandford, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 741, 22 Eng. Rep. 629 (Ch. 1726);
Whelpdale v. Cookson, 1 Ves. Sen. 9, 27 Eng. Rep. 856 (Ch. 1747).
81. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503 (1846).

82.
83.
84.
ment

Id. at 555.
324 U.S. 49 (1944).
364 U.S. 520 (1961). In Muschany a representative of the War Departagreed that one McDowell should undertake to secure options to buy
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From the above review of cases it may be seen that the conflict of
interest statutes add nothing to the basic law of fiduciaries. It is true
that all save one of the statutes provide criminal sanctions for their
violations. It perhaps speaks well for the ethical standards of our
government employees that so few of them have been convicted under
the statutes, but it is more realistic to conclude that the criminal provisions are ineffective. Nor do the statutes provide an external standard by which an employee might measure his conduct. The statutes
are almost unintelligible on this point. And query: Is not the standard of duty required of a fiduciary an external standard?
V. CONCLUSION
As was said earlier, no purpose is served by an elaborate criticism
of the conflict of interest statutes. Rather, attention should be focused
on how the inevitable revision is to be made. The discussion of the
statutes and the correlated fiduciary principles raised the pertinent
issues and posed some of the problems involved. The variables to be
considered in solving the problem are infinite, but some observations
would seem applicable to any program.
First, no program will provide all the answers. The problem of
conflict of interest is inherent in organized government. Moreover,
the problem is aggravated by extensive non-governmental activities
(e.g., public power projects, public transportation), such as exist at
all levels of government today. And any program must give prime
consideration to the connected problem of recruiting competent personnel for government service. This problem is co-equal with that of
conflict of interest. Neither problem can be considered as subservient
85
to the other.
The writer is one of those who believes that detailed statutory revision is not the answer to the problem. 6 Of course, statutes are essential to a degree, but a code of ethics similar to the professional canons
would seem more beneficial. An independent group should be established to which inquiries could be directed as to whether certain
land for the United States. McDowell's remuneration was a commission
of five per cent of the gross sale price, i.e., the higher the price the government
paid, the more money McDowell made. It would seem that an irreconcilable
conflict of interest existed but the Court found that the agent's activities
were authorized by statute and did not in any event come within the purview
of any of the conflict of interest laws. It is difficult to resolve the narrow
view of Muschany with the very broad holding of Dixon-Yates.
85. BAR STUDY 3.
86. Becker, Ethics in Public Life-A Challenge to the Lawyer, 2 DE PAUL

L. REV. 194 (1953); Davis, The Federal Conflict of Interest Laws, 54 COLUM. L.
R v. 893, 914 (1954); Douglas, W. 0., Honesty in Government, 4 OKLA. L. REV.
279 (1951); Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in
Public Office, 54 COLTJm. L. REv. 214 (1954); Pepper, Morality in Government,
1 J. PuB. L. 335 (1952).
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conduct is proper in given fact situations. This group should have
authority to bind the government by its decisions. After approval had
been given that a government employee might act in a certain situation, the employee should not be subject to later indictment for his
activities nor should the legal result of this activity be voidable at
the option of the government. As it now stands, an employee who is
unsure of a course of action has no person or authority to whom he
may go for a legally effective answer. The rule that no agent can
bind the government by his acts is a carry-over from the idea that
"the King can do no wrong." It is an anachronism where the government plays so great a part in the business and economic activities of
the country. It may be said that if the employee is aware of the conflict of interest, he is already disqualified from acting, but this assumes
that all employees have the same "awareness" threshold. Honest
minds can differ on what amounts to a conflict of interest. Loyalty is
a two-way affair, and it is not too much to ask that the government
offer some protection to its employees who act in good faith. Collusion
is a possible objection to delegating authority to a group to bind the
government, but it is not thought to be prohibitive.
The ultimate solution of the problem of conflict of interest must
be essentially an ethical one. Thus the suggestion of fiduciary principles as guide posts. Governmental ethical standards can not be set
apart from society's general moral atmosphere. Yet there does exist a
double standard of ethical conduct; one for government personnel and
another for those outside government. This is more what the public
thinks "ought" to be as opposed to what "is." We all like to impose
on certain groups (ministers, teachers, doctors) a higher set of standards than need be followed by ordinary folk. This is no more than a
form of self-deception, a rationalization of a person's own lack of selfdiscipline. This paper has suggested that a government employee be
held to the standard of conduct of a fiduciary, but this standard should
be no higher than that required of non-governmental fiduciaries.
What seems to be needed is a restatement of the fundamentals of
integrity and morality which can then be applied by the body proposed above. The following summary of the three great domains of
human conduct by Lord Moulton would be an appropriate beginning
to such a restatement.
First comes the domain of Positive Law, where our actions are prescribed
by laws binding upon us which must be obeyed. Next comes the domain
of Free Choice, which includes all those actions as to which we claim and
enjoy complete freedom. But between these two there is a third large
and important domain in which there rules neither Positive Law nor
Absolute Freedom. In that domain there is no law which inexorably

determines our course of action, and yet we feel that we are not free to
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choose as we would. The degree of this sense of a lack of complete freedom in this domain varies in every case. It grades from a consciousness
of a Duty nearly as strong as Positive Law, to a feeling that the matter
is all but a question of personal choice. Some might wish to parcel out
this domain into separate countries, calling one, for instance, the domain
of Duty, another the domain of Public Spirit, another the domain of
Good Form; but I prefer to look at it as all one domain, for it has one and
the same characteristic throughout-it is the domain of Obedience to the
Unenforceable. The obedience is the obedience of a man to that which he
cannot be forced to obey. He is the enforcer of the law upon himself....
In the changes that are taking place in the world around us, one of
those which is fraught with grave peril is the discredit into which this
idea of the middle land is falling....
[T]here is a widespread tendency to regard the fact that they can do a
thing as meaning that they may do it. There can be no more fatal error
than this. Between "can do" and "may do" ought to exist the whole
realm which recognizes the sway of duty, fairness, sympathy, taste, and
all the other things that make life beautiful and society possible ...
I am not afraid to trust people-my fear is that people will not see that
trust is being reposed in them. Hence, I have no wish that Positive Law
should annex this intermediate country. On the contrary, I dread it.
Instead of the iron rule of law being thrown over it I would rather see it
well policed by the inhabitants. I am too well acquainted with the inadequacy of the formal language of statutes to prefer them to the living
action of public and private sense of duty.87
JAmEs E. HOLmEs*

HYPNOTISM AND THE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1890 St. Clair Thomson, noted London physician, defined hypnotism as "a disease which effects the nervous system."' In 1943 Professor George Estabrooks, of Colgate University, defined hypnotism
87. Moulton, Law and Manners, 134 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 1 (1924), reprinted in CHEATHAM, CASES ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 124-25 (4th ed. 1955).
* Mr. Holmes is now associated with Fowler, White, Gillen, Humkey &
Trenam, Tampa, Florida.
1. Thompson, The Dangers of Hypnotism, 9 WESTMINSTER REV. 624, 626
(1890). The Supreme Court of California accepted this definition in 1894 in
People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 Pac. 689, 691 (1894). Dr. Thomson
was also of the opinion that only a very small portion of the people could
be hypnotized, that ignorant peasants and ex-soldiers who are accustomed to
blind obedience made the best subjects, and that if a person was subject to
hypnosis he was a neurotic with an "unstable equilibrium" and a "frail
nervous organization." Thomson, supra at 628-29. Today we know that
practically any person free from intoxication, extremely low mentality,- or
mental disorder can be hypnotized. See Note, 31 NEB. L. REV. 577 (1952)
(citing authorities). Some doctors have hypnotized between 80 and 96%
of their patients. Professor Baudouin, of Geneva, stated that 98% of the
people are-hypnotizable. Susceptibility is perhaps more dependent on concentration than anything else. Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12
CAN. B. REv. 14, 16 (1934).
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simply as "exaggerated suggestibility. '2 While this change in definition vividly illustrates the scientific advances made in the area of
hypnosis, the legal approach has remained stagnant and immutable.
The law can no longer hide behind the language of Commissioner
Searls in People v. Eubanks that "the law of the United States does
not recognize hypnotism." 3 Hypnosis has most assuredly "come of
age. ' 4 It is used for psychotherapeutic purposes;5 as an aid for
stuttering, alcoholism, skin diseases, allergies, asthma, digestive disorders, muscular aches and pains, sex difficulties, and obstetric prob-

lems;6 as an anesthetic;7 as a weight-reducing aid; 8 and in crime
detection and warfare. 9 Hypnosis demands legal recognition and
control.
The purpose of this Note is to point out the more important areas
in which the phenomenon of hypnosis has impinged upon the law,
and then to suggest some necessary changes in the legal approach to
the problems encountered. The subject matter has been categorized
into three main divisions and various subdivisions having to do
with the relation between hypnosis and the criminal law, hypnosis
and the law of evidence, and with the current and suggested regulation of hypnosis.

II. RELATION OF HYPNOSIS TO THE CRIMINAL LAW
The problems encountered in dealing with hypnosis and criminal
law can be subdivided into two main categories: (1) crimes committed
upon the hypnotized subject, and (2) crimes committed by, or
through, the hypnotized subject. The core of the problem involved
in these crimes is the allocation of responsibility between the hypnotist and his subject for the wrongful conduct.
Before discussing the specific place hypnotism occupies in criminal
2. Estabrooks, Mobs Ruled by Hypnotism, Science Digest, Oct. 1943, p. 41.
The accepted legal definition of hypnosis appears to be, "a condition, artificially produced, in which the person hypnotized, apparently asleep, acts in
obedience to the will of the operator
. . ."
Austin v. Barker, 110
App. Div. 510, 96 N.Y.S., 814, 818 (1906). The scientist would say that a
hypnotic state exists whenever "an individual reaches a state of hypersuggestibility measured by a standard scale of trance depth and equal to the degree
of hypersuggestibility he is known to attain under the influence of tranceinducing suggestions."

WEITZENHOFFER, HYPNOTISM:

AN OBJECTIVE STUDY IN

74 (1953).
3. 117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049, 1053 (1897).

SUGGESTIBILITY

4. See WOLFE & ROSENTHAL, HYPNOTISM COMES OF AGE (1948); Miller,
Hypnotism Comes of Age, Reader's Digest, Oct. 1943, p. 11.
5. See WOLBERG, HYPNOANALYSIS (1945).
6. LECRON &BoRnEAus, HYPNOTISM TODAY 163-266 (1947).
7. Sears, Experimental Study of Hypnotic Anesthesia, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1943).
8. Pierce, Grow Slim by Hypnotism?, Science Digest, Oct. 1951, p. 36.
9. Estabrooks, Mobs Ruled by Hypnotism, Science Digest, Oct. 1943, p. 41.
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law, it seems appropriate to consider the following issues relating
to the phenomenon itself:
(a) Can a hypnotized person be induced to commit or to submit
to a crime that is against his moral feelings? There appears to be a
decided conflict of opinion on this matter and authorities can be
found to support either position. Some authorities believe that every
conceivable crime will be committed by, or can be committed upon,
a hypnotized subject provided a high degree of hypnosis is attained. 10
Others take the position that a person under hypnosis can not be induced to do or say anything which he would consider indecent or
harmful." The latter view is indeed an extreme position since everyone has occasionally committed what he considered immoral or harmful acts even when in a completely sober state. Liegeois, a pioneer in
the field of hypnosis, attempted to prove the power of suggestion
over an individual's morals by means of numerous experiments. He
gave a young girl whom he had hypnotized a powder consisting of
sugar telling her that it was arsenic and that he desired her to poison
her aunt. The next day as a result of Liegeois' post-hypnotic suggestion the girl put the sugar in her aunt's lemonade. Liegeois also in2
duced a girl to fire a pistol which she believed loaded at her mother.'
On the other hand, Davis, an English scientist, reported that his
experiments indicated that a person would not submit to suggestions
contrary to his moral framework no matter how deep the somnambulism.13 A recent legal writer on the subject has concluded from his
study of the authorities that "the more modern and seemingly scientifically accurate view is that such a result (i.e., the induced commission of a crime) is highly probable, if suggested under the proper circumstances and in the appropriate manner."1 4 The truth is possibly
somewhere between the two extremes. Often times a law-abiding
citizen is shocked by the subconscious desires expressed in his dreams.
Perhaps under hypnotic suggestion the normal restraints on such
desires could be overcome, but it is doubtful that without the presence
of a subconscious desire most people could be induced to commit a
wrongful act. Since, however, the law must 'provide for the exception
as well as the norm, it is submitted that jurists should not close their
eyes to the possibility that any criminal suggestion may be accepted
10. FOREL, HYPNOTISM OR SUGGESTION AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 250 (1905).
11. Miller, Hypnotism Comes of Age, Reader's Digest, Oct. 1943, p. 11.

12. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 180 (1902).
13. Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REV. 14, 18 (1934).
The experiments have been attacked from both sides on the ground the
subject is usually aware of the desired result, and that during the laboratory
experiment he is vaguely conscious that he is acting a part. Ladd, Legal
Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 181 (1902).
14. Levy, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 46 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S.
333,357 (1955).
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under hypnosis. This is especially true since it is possible for the subject to be tricked into a crime by suggestions which make it appear
that he would be doing a meritorious act. For example, a hypnotized
subject has been persuaded to fire an empty pistol, which he believed
loaded, at a servant under the suggestion that the subject was being
attacked by robbers who would endeavor to take his life.1 5 Likewise,
a man who would not steal would not hesitate taking an item which
he believed was his property. Such misleading suggestions will be
readily accepted by a person under hypnosis.
These principles must be kept in mind in fixing the criminal
responsibility of both the subject and the hypnotist.
(b) Can a person be hypnotized against his will? The majority and
perhaps the more accurate view is that a person can be hypnotized
without his consent, especially after the first time.16 There are
numerous techniques the hypnotist may employ in order to get the
attention and cooperation of the subject without conveying the idea
17
that hypnosis is being attempted.
(c) Will the subject always forget what occurred during hypnosis?
Here again the authorities seem to be in conflict. Gray states that the
"subject always has amnesia for what occurred during the trance."18
On the other hand, a New York court in Austin v. Barker accepted
the view that "upon awakening there may be a vivid recollection of
all that happened during the apparent sleep."' 9 From a legal standpoint the better position would seem to recognize the possibility of
either occurrence depending upon the individual hypnotized, the de20
gree of hypnosis obtained, and the suggestions of the hypnotist. If
there is a memory loss immediately following the trance it may be
21
revived by subsequent hypnosis.
A. Crimes Committed Upon the Hypnotized Subject
1. Sexual Offences.-The more common types of crimes committed
upon a hypnotized person are those of a sexual nature. There appears
15. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 180 (1902).
16. WOLFE & ROSENTHAL, HYPNOTISM COMES OF AGE 94 (1948); Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REV. 14, 17 (1934); Note, 31 NEB. L.
REV. 575, 577 (1952). Contra,Miller, Hypnotism Comes of Age, Reader's Digest,
Oct. 1943, p. 11.
17. See Hypnotism as a Weapon, Newsweek, July 19, 1943, p. 70 (quoting
from Dr. George H. Estabrooks).
18. 1 GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 96.17 (3d ed. 1958).

19. 110 App. Div. 510, 96 N.Y.S. 814, 818 (1906).
20. See WOLFE & ROSENTHAL, HYPNOTISM COMES OF AGE 91-93

(1948), for

a recognition of the importance of the degree of hypnosis attained and the
suggestions of the operator as to what the subject will remember of the
events which took place during the trance.
21. Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REV. 14, 18 (1934).
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to be little doubt that a hypnotized female can not only be made to
submit to sexual abuse, but can be made an active participant in the
sexual act.22
The most famous case of this nature was that of Czynski,2 3 tried in
Bavaria in 1894. Czynski was convicted under an indictment charging
that he had resorted to hypnotic suggestion in order to obtain illicit
intercourse. Another famous continental case occurred in France in
1865 when a roving beggar named Castellan was sentenced to twelve
years penal servitude for seducing a young girl by means of hyp24
nosis.
Among American cases State v. DonovanZ, a criminal prosecution
for seduction, held that evidence of a seduction accomplished either
by hypnotism or love-making, or both, was sufficient to warrant a
conviction. Austin v. Barker,26 a civil seduction case, recognized that
seduction could be accomplished by hypnosis but found the evidence
of hypnosis insufficient to sustain a verdict.
The question of whether intercourse procured by hypnosis would
support a conviction for rape was before the California Supreme
Court as early as 1878.27 The court held that since force is a necessary
element in the crime of rape, the employment of arts and devices,
without violence, by which the moral nature of the female is corrupted
so that she is no longer able to resist the temptation to yield to sexual
desire is not sufficient to constitute rape. The court by dicta classified
such acts under seduction.
Since there are two variations of wording in American rape statutes,
those which define rape as obtaining intercourse without the woman's
consent, and those which define it as having intercourse against the
woman's will, it has been argued that the wording of the statute is
determinative as hypnosis vitiates consent but not the will.28 Such a
22. Note, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575, 581 (1952) (citing authority).
23. The case is reported in Ellinger, The Case of Czynski, 14 MED. L.J. 150

(1897).

24. MOLL, HYPNOTISm 403 (Hopkirks transl. 1909). Moll refers to the case
as one of rape by hypnosis although there was doubt as to whether Castellan's
influence over the girl actually reached the point of hypnosis. For other
European cases prior to 1909, see MOLL, supra at 402-44.
25. 128 Iowa 44, 102 N.W. 791 (1905).
26. 11 App. Div. 510, 96 N.Y.S. 814 (1906). The same court set aside an
earlier verdict for the plaintiff on the same grounds. 90 App. Div. 351, 85
N.Y.S. 465 (1904).

The plaintiff, a poor witness, was subjected to an able

and rigorous cross-examination, and the court felt that the record did not
support the verdict. To bolster their conclusion the court took the position
that there is usually a vivid recollection of all that happens during the trance,
thus casting suspicion upon plaintiff's testimony that she remembered nothing

of the occasion until later hypnotic examination.
27. People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62 (1878).
28. Note, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575, 582 (1952). The note also hypothesizes that
in those states that have abolished the criminal actions for seduction or in
those requiring a promise to marry and having the consent type rape statute
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conclusion presupposes that hypnosis is an absolute and ignores the
fact that a great deal is still unknown about the phenomenon itself.29
2. Theft.-Similar problems are suggested by a holding of an Alabama court that the requisite force necessary to support a conviction
for common law robbery did not exist where defendant enticed a
woman to part with her money by means of hypnotism.30 The case
has been criticized 3' by analogy to the seduction cases and to State v.
Snyder,32 in which the producing of unconsciousness by a drug to
obtain money in the custody of the person so rendered unconscious
was held a sufficient exercise of force within the meaning of common
law robbery.
3. Undue Influence in Testamentary Schemes.-It would also seem
that hypnosis could be an effective conduit of undue influence in testamentary schemes and that such use of hypnosis should come within
the scope of criminal statutes. Although there are no reported American cases directly in point, the writers on undue influence have recognized the possibility and coined the phrase "hypnotic influence" in
dealing with the problem. 33 "Hypnotic influence" has been discussed
more fully in opinions in non-criminal cases. In a will contest in
France in 1893, the court set aside a will leaving all of testatrix's
property to a professional magnetist when it was shown that the magnetist had hypnotized her and that he had complete control over her
mind and body.3 4 Sir Edward Marshall Hall, a famous English barrister, however, failed to upset a will even though the legatee admitted
35
putting testatrix in a hypnotic trance on several occasions.
4. Homicide.-Hall also handled the famous murder case of
George Smith who was sentenced to death for the bathtub drownings of three of his wives. At the trial the Crown had a difficult time
explaining the lack of evidence of violence. Hall, in his private corthere is a loophole in the law which would permit sexual abuses by means
of hypnosis to go unpunished.
29. For instance in cases involving sexual crimes by the aid of hypnosis the
courts must be careful not to confuse hypnotic influence with intense sexual
excitement. Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REv. 82 (1934).
30. Louis v. State, 24 Ala. App. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930).
31. 22 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 279 (1931). The writer of this comment felt
that the conviction could be supported by the doctrine of constructive force.
32. 41 Nev. 453, 172 Pac. 364 (1918).
33. Note, 31 NE. L. REV. 575, 584 (1952) (citing authority). The writer
feels that Fyan v. McNutt, 226 Mich. 406, 254 N.W. 146 (1934) and Griffith v.
Scott, 128 Okla. 125, 261 Pac. 371 (1927) strongly suggest that factually a
hypnotic influence could have existed, but the opinions do not mention the
possibility. Experiments indicate that one can be hypnotically influenced
to leave all his property to a total stranger. MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS
STAND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 175-78 (1930).
34. Note, 40 L.R.A. 269, 270 (1897).
35. MARJORIBANKS, FOR THE DEFENSE: THE LIFE OF SIR EDWARD MARSHALL
HALL, 104-05 (1929).
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respondence, expressed the view that the deaths were hypnotically
induced suicides. 36 Other commentators agree that suicide may be
37
accomplished by hypnotism.
5. Subornation of Perjury.-Falsification of testimony can theoretically be obtained by hypnosis since retroactive hallucinations can
be firmly cemented in a subject's mind during hypnosis.3 8
6. Conclusions.-It would'seem that most of the problems involved
in the various crimes committed upon the hypnotized subject are
adequately governed by our present law, with the exception of the
sexual assault and theft cases. Until more is known about the
phenomenon of hypnosis the writer feels that the lawmakers should
not bring the hypnotic sexual assault cases within the legal definition
of rape. As to the theft cases, both robbery and larceny require an
absence of consent, and the procurement of consent by hypnosis
would not seem to fit the definitions. It is suggested that the extortion
statutes be amended to expressly encompass the hypnotic theft cases.
B. Crimes Committed by or Through the Hypnotized Subject
1. Homicide.-The most celebrated case in which hypnosis was interposed as a defense to murder occurred many years ago in France
when Gabriele Bompard claimed that she participated in the murder
of her husband while under the hypnotic influence of her lover. The
court disallowed the defense declaring that "an honest subject resists
a dishonest suggestion," and that if he obeys "it is not because his
'39
An American court 40
will is subjugated, but because he consents.
went to the other extreme, acquitting the subject and executing the
hypnotizer. One McDonald shot and killed deceased. He was acquitted, however, upon a plea that he had been hypnotically influenced
to commit his crime by Gray.41 Gray was tried separately and found
guilty of murder in the first degree. On appeal 42 the court sustained
the conviction.
In People v. Worthington,43 an 1894 California case, the defendant
36. MARJORIBANKS, op. cit. supra note 35, at 311-44.
37. Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REV. 80, 83 (1934);
Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173 (1902).
38. Allen, supra note 37, at 88. An able and rigorous cross-examination can
minimize the danger of falsified testimony by means of hypnosis.
39. Ladd, supra note 37, at 183.
40. State v. Gray, 55 Kan. 135, 39 Pac. 1050 (1895).
41. Ladd, supra note 37, at 183.
42. State v. Gray, 55 Kan. 135, 39 Pac. 1050 (1895).
43. 105 Cal. 166, 38 Pac. 689 (1894). Another American case of murder
by a hypnotized person is mentioned in Note, 40 L.R.A. 269, 271 (1897). "[I]n
1895 Hayward was hanged in St. Paul, Minnesota, accused of having induced
Blitz by hypnotic suggestions to murder Miss Ging. Blitz was sent to the
penitentiary for life."
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was indicted for second degree murder in the pistol slaying of her
lover. Her defenses were insanity and hypnotism. The court refused
to admit evidence of the effect of hypnosis since the only evidence of
hypnosis was the testimony of the accused that another had told her
to commit the crime.
2. Theft.-Although no reported cases have been found in which
theft was accomplished by or through a hypnotized subject, successful
experiments have been conducted in this area, and the authorities are
in accord that it is possible, either by misleading suggestion or by
44
overcoming the moral barrier, to induce a hypnotized subject to steal.
3. Forgery.-It has been suggested that a person under hypnosis
can not only be induced to commit forgery but can simulate signatures
with great accuracy. Experiments, however, have been conducted in
which it was found that the handwriting of a person under hypnosis
retains all its normal characteristics, 45 that attempted fabrications of
other signatures are no better than when the individual attempts the
fabrication in a normal state, and that a hypnotized person cannot
46
simulate his own handwriting of an earlier age.
4. The Problem of Collective Suggestibility.-Before discussing the
criminal responsibility of the hypnotist and the subject, it is necessary
to mention the concept of "collective suggestibility. ''47 The courts have
frequently had self-confessed lynchers before them and refused to
convict on the theory that the accused had become so excited by the
collective suggestibility of the mob action, that they lacked the
requisite criminal intent.48 The power of collective suggestibility,
however, although very persuasive is not actually hypnotism though
often referred to as such.
5. Criminal Responsibility.-Returning now to a consideration of
criminal responsibility, it seems beyond dispute that the hypnotist,
who induces his subject to commit a crime, should be held responsible to the full extent of the law for the actions of the subject.
The legal liability of the hypnotized subject is a more difficult
question. The decision of the Bompard case that a person who commits a crime under hypnosis is guilty because he is a criminal anyway
cannot be sustained. Such an over-simplification fails to take into
account the complexity of the psychic make-up that controls one's
44. Allen, supra note 37, at 85.

45. Lacy, Handwritingand Forgery Under Hypnosis, 34 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S.

338, 339 (1944) (citing AMEs, FORGERY (1901)).
46. Ibid.
47. See Estabrooks, Mobs Ruled by Hypnotism, Science Digest, Oct. 1943,
p. 41 in which Hitler is referred to as "the world's greatest hypnotist."
48. Note, 31 NEB. L. REv. 575, 588 (1952).
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personality. Also, as previously stated, modern science recognizes
that a person can be induced by misleading suggestions to commit a
crime while believing that he is performing a meritorious act.
It has been suggested that a person who voluntarily submits to
hypnosis and thereby aids the hypnotist by placing himself in a
vulnerable position should, for having surrendered the control of his
will, incur liability for all his acts committed while in a state of
hypnosis. 49 Although this has been referred to as the majority view,50
it too appears to be an oversimplification. As to crimes committed
solely by the subject without suggestion by the hypnotist, there exists
an analogy to the legal liability of a person who voluntarily enters a
state of intoxication. But no such case can be found, and the above
rule was intended to apply to cases where the crime is suggested by
the hypnotist-that is, to crimes committed through the subject. The
intoxication analogy breaks down with the intervention of another
personality. Surely a person who submits to hypnotic examination by
a reputable psychiatrist cannot be said reasonably to anticipate that
he would be used as a pawn for the criminal purposes of the
psychiatrist. He is not to be compared to the person who willfully
consumes an excessive amount of alcohol.
Of course, a person who voluntarily submits to hypnosis in order
to avoid liability for a premeditated criminal act or who suspects
beforehand that he will be used for criminal purposes should be held
to the same degree of accountability as if he were in a perfectly
normal state. But, if a person is hypnotized against his will or enters
the trance without suspecting the possibility of foul play, resort
should be had to expert testimony in order to determine the appropriate liability commensurate with the degree in which the individual's
will power is subdued. This degree of liability may on occasion exonerate him, but more often it will fall somewhere in between complete
subjugation and complete responsibility. It is submitted that an application of the irresistible impulse test to all cases of hypnotic crime
would be the most desirable way to handle the problem.

III.

RELATION OF HYPNOSIS TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

The phenomenon of hypnosis appears in the law of evidence in two
main areas. First, there is the question of post-hypnotic influence on
the credibility of a witness; and second, the problem of the admissi49. Levy, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 46 J. CRnm. L., C. & P.S. 333,
339 (1955). Contra, Allen, Hypnotism and Its Legal Import, 12 CAN. B. REv.
80, 86 (1934); Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173 (1902).
Ladd is erroneously cited by Levy as supporting the view of ipso facto
liability.
50. Levy, op. cit. supranote 49.
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bility of statements made while the declarant is under hypnosis.
1. Credibility.-The possibility that hypnosis can be used to falsify

testimony by means of retroactive hallucinations and post-hypnotic
suggestions has already been mentioned. The North Carolina court
showed that it was aware of this possibility in State v. Exum5 ' in
which it was held that evidence that defendant had hypnotized his
wife on several occasions was admissible, since it was relevant to the
credibility of her testimony in his behalf. The court felt that this
tended to show that defendant's influence over his wife was greater
than is normally attributable to such a relationship. The decision has
52
found support in recent legal articles on hypnosis.
2. Hypnotic statements.-It is believed by some scientists that a
hypnotized person will unconsciously reveal truths that he would
otherwise conceal in a normal state.53 Yet there is also the danger
that a person under hypnosis may be able to weave subtle webs of
falsehood or yield to mistake or fantasy.5 4 In view of this, and the

added danger that the hypnotist may intentionally or unintentionally
mold the examination with his suggestions, 55 the authorities have
unanimously agreed that the reliability of hypnosis has not yet been
sufficiently established to merit the admissibility of statements made
while the subject is in the trance. 56 Moreover, when the statements
are of an incriminating nature such as a confession, there remains
the constitutional barrier of the privilege against self-incrimination.7
For similar reasons, the courts have refused to admit evidence
obtained exclusively from hypnotic drugs 58 or the lie detector, 9
although these devices are widely used for detection purposes, in order
to obtain leads by which legally admissible evidence may be
60
obtained.
51. 138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905).

52. Levy, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 46 J. CPlM. L., C. & P.S. 333,
340 (1955); Note, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575, 593 (1952).
53. See Note, supra note 52, at 590 (citing authority).
54. WOLFE & ROSENTHAL, HYPNoTiSM COMES OF AGE 104 (1948); Ladd,

Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 188 ,(1902).
55. Allen, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 12 CAN. B. REV. 80, 90 (1934).
It is possible hypnotically to suggest to an innocent person that he is guilty
and thereby obtain a confession.
56. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 998 (1940); Allen, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 188 (1902); Levy, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 46
J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 333, 341 (1955).
57. Levy, supra note 56.
58. On hypnotic drugs and their reliability see Despres, Legal Aspects of
Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1946); Dession, Freedman,

Donnelly & Redbook, Drug Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62
YALE L.J. 315 (1953); Muehlberger, InterrogationUnder Drug Influence: The
So-Called "Truth Serum" Technique, 42 J. Calm. L., C. & P.S. 513 (1951).
59. Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (offer by defendant); People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P.2d 70 (Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 888 (1950) (offer by prosecution).
60. In Cornell v. Superior Court of San Diego, 52 Cal. App. 2d 99, 338 P.2d
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The question of whether statements made during hypnosis could be
admitted as evidence was first before the American courts in 1897. In
People v. Eubanks 61 the Supreme Court of California affirmed the
trial court's refusal to admit evidence of an expert hypnotist that he
had hypnotized the defendant and that while under hypnosis the
defendant had denied his guilt. In 1950 the North Dakota Supreme
Court likewise excluded evidence of a hypnotic examination offered
62
in defendant's behalf at a murder prosecution.
The case most frequently cited for the proposition that statements
63
made under hypnosis are not admissible in evidence is Rex v. Booher,
a 1928 Canadian case. The Crown had employed one Dr. Langsner, a
criminologist, to learn the whereabouts of the murder weapon and
ultimately to obtain a confession from the defendant. After frequent
visits to defendant's cell, Dr. Langsner was successful in both respects.
Although he admitted being capable of hypnotizing people, Langsner
denied that he had used hypnotism or even talked with the defendant.
He stated that he effectuated the results by "feeling the defendant's
thoughts." The court refused to admit the confession, holding that the
Crown had failed to establish that it was not exacted by means of
mental suggestion; the murder weapon, the whereabouts of which
had been learned as a result of Langsner's examination, was allowed
to be introduced in evidence.
In a very similar case the Supreme Court of the United States
dodged an opportunity to pass on the admissibility of hypnotically
induced statements. 64 In a murder case the district attorney employed
a psychiatrist to question the defendant. After an examination,
defendant confessed to the hammer-slaying of his parents but at the
trial he objected to the introduction of the confession on the ground
that it was hypnotically induced. The doctor emphatically denied
447 (Sup. Ct. 1959), the defendant who was awaiting trial for murder was
unable to remember his movements on the night in question. Cornell, his
attorney, sought to induce memory recall through hypnosis and, upon the

refusal of the sheriff to allow the hypnotist to accompany him for that purpose, petitioned the San Diego Superior Court. Upon denial of his petition,
Cornell brought mandamus in the Supreme Court. The court held that,
irrespective of the admissibility of such evidence as statements made by the
defendant during the examination, hypnosis was recognized by medical
authorities for the desired purpose which was the revival of a memory lapse,
and the defendant had a constitutional right to such examination in order
to prepare his defense.
61. 117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049 (1897).
62. State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950). In this case an
expert on the subject of hypnosis had hypnotized defendant on several
occasions and questioned him while he was in such a trance for the purpose
of ascertaining whether the defendant was telling the truth or whether he
was guilty of the charge made against him. The court affirmed the trial
judge's refusal to admit in evidence the statements made during the examination.
63. 50 Can. Crim. Cas. Ann. 271, 4 D.L.R. 795 (1928).
64. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
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that he had hypnotized the defendant. One expert testified after
listening to a recording of the examination, that the psychiatrist's
actions could have been nothing but hypnotism. 65 The issue of
hypnotism was submitted to the jury, and they found adversely to
defendant. The court of appeals 66 refused to interfere with the jury's
findings on hypnosis, since it was one of fact concerned largely with
the credibility of the defendant as against the doctor. The confession,
however, was found to be coerced and was held inadmissible on that
ground.67 After the case was remanded for a new trial, 68 it reached
the Supreme Court on the issue of whether the coercion extended to
subsequent confessions made the same evening.69 The Court held that
all of the confessions made following the examination were involuntary and mentally coerced, but refused to pass on the effect of hypnosis
as such.
Thus it has been seen that although the science of hypnosis has not
yet attained sufficient reliability to merit the admissibility of hypnotic
statements, its use as a detection device for the exaction of "leads" has
been fully recognized and occasionally utilized. Yet, even if its
trustworthiness as an inquisitional device is someday established, the
admissibility of hypnotic statements in legal proceedings will still
be in doubt because of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Also, it appears that such inquisitional devices may not
0
be entirely consistent with our adversary system.7
IV.

THE REGULATION OF HYPNOSIS

The present legislation dealing specifically with hypnosis is dangerously inadequate. The statutory law is almost entirely devoid of any
recognition of the legal problems inherent in the phenomenon of
hypnotism.
Nebraska, 71 Oregon,72 and South Dakota 3 have passed laws forbid65. See Levy, Hypnosis and Legal Immutability, 46 J. CRni. L., C. & P.S.

333, 342-43 n.61 (1955) (quoting parts of the examination from the appellate
brief).
66. 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d, 553 (1951).
67. It seems that the defendant was not informed that the psychiatrist had
been called in by the district attorney or that anything he might say during
the examination might be held against him, that the district attorney and the
police had wired the examination room without defendant's permission and
were recording the conversation, and that the psychiatrist played upon defendant's natural hopes and fears. A long series of legal battles followed.
68. 304 N.Y. 468, 108 N.E.2d 673 (1952), motion to amend remittitur granted,
304 N.Y. 844, 109 N.E.2d 714 (1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918 (1952), petition
for rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 946 (1952); 113 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);

208 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. granted,347 U.S. 926.
69. Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
70. Note, 31 NEB. L. REv. 575, 592-93 (1952).
71. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1111 (1956). The Nebraska statute does not forbid
public shows of hypnotism unless they are conducted for gain. See Dill v.
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ding public shows of hypnotism. Kansas forbids the public hypnotism
of a minor under eighteen years of age,7 4 and South Dakota forbids the
hypnotism of any minor, whether in public or private, unless consent
in writing is first obtained from the minor's parent or guardian.
Physicians who regularly employ psychotherapy in their practice are
exempted from operation of the statute. 75 Virginia has enacted an
absolute prohibition against hypnosis unless performed by a licensed
physician or surgeon.7 6 Maine" and Massachusetts7 8 have exempted
hypnotists from their medical licensing laws. The Wyoming legislature recently repealed the most punitive statute of all,7 9 which, in
contrast to the above misdemeanor statutes, made it a felony to
hypnotize any person under twenty-one years of age in any public
show or exhibition 80 and a misdemeanor to hypnotize anyone under
twenty-one years of age for any purpose other than medical or
surgical treatment with the consent of the parent or guardian.8' The
Tennessee legislature has viewed the problem as a revenue measure
and seen fit to require all "fortune tellers, clairvoyants, hypnotists,
spiritualists, palmists, phrenologists, etc." to pay an annual $250
82
privilege tax.
The only legislation closely resembling an attempt to meet the
problem of hypnosis as a criminal defense are the statutes requiring
83
consciousness of the criminal act as an element of criminal capacity.
These statutes were not passed with an intent to meet the problems
of the hypnotic crime (only the Idaho statute is indexed under
hypnosis), and it is doubtful if they will ever be sufficient to meet
the problems. As previously stated, the irresistible impulse test could
best handle the defense of hypnotism.
It is submitted that the public exhibition of hypnotic subjects should
be forbidden in all states, if for no other reason than it tends to
degrade an important facet of medical science. "The average person,
hearing the word hypnotism, envisages a grotesque stage character
Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N.W. 62 (1940)
statute).
72. ORE. REV. STAT. § 167.705 (1959).

(upholding constitutionality of the

The Oregon statute does not require

that the show be for gain in order to be forbidden.
73. S. D. CODE § 13.3502 (1939). Mere public display of a hypnotized person
irrespective of gain is forbidden.
74. KAN.GEN.STAT. ANN. § 38-703 (1949).
75. S.D. CODE § 13.3501 (1939).
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-414 (1960).
77. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 66, § 8 (1954).
78. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 112, § 6 (1957).

79. Repeated by Wyoming Laws 1959, c.100, § 1.
80. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN.§ 14-8 (1957).

81. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 14-9 (1957).
82. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4203-47 (1956).

Query: Would this privilege tax

apply to a licensed psychiatrist who utilizes hypnosis for therapeutic purposes?
83. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-201 (5)

(1947).
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84
with piercing eyes demonstrating a wicked power of black magic."
The abolition of these stage performances would go a long way toward
restoring hypnosis to its rightful place as an effective tool of science.
As early as 1902 it was advocated that public displays of hypnotism
in America should be forbidden85 as they were in Italy, Switzerland,
86
and Portugal.
Another reason for forbidding public performances of hypnotism
is that too many stage hypnotists lack scientific or medical training
and are totally unaware of the serious consequences that can flow
from a single mishap. They are interested in sensationalism at the
expense of caution. The subject who is on the verge of a serious
maladjustive reaction or of a nervous breakdown should be hypnotized only by the clinically trained hypnotist who is aware of the
subject's condition since the cathartic effect of hypnosis produces
extremely high tension.87 A precaution that is always taken by the
therapeutic or experimental hypnotist is to remain with the subject
fifteen or twenty minutes after bringing him out of the trance to make
sure that he has fully returned to a waking state and that only the

desired suggestions will have a post-hypnotic effect. 88 It is doubtful

if many stage hypnotists take these precautions.
All authorities seem to agree that hypnotism in the hands of
amateurs can result in serious consequences, 89 although they would
not go to the extremes of the experts consulted in the Spurgeon Young
case.90 In this case an autopsy was performed following the death of
a young lad in New York. The coroner put the following hypothetical
question to a number of leading medical jurists throughout the
country:
[W]hether in a case of youth, seventeen years of age, who had for
approximately six months been a chronic sensitive subject, having been
protractedly and repeatedly hypnotized many times by amateurs and
irresponsible and reckless youthful dabblers in hypnotism,-would physical injury or organic impairment, directly or indirectly, follow from the
psychic or emotional disturbances or derangement of nerve function,
involved in or due to, the morbid innervation incident to such hypnotic
practice, or experimentation in mesmerism, or alleged animal magnetism? 91
84. Note, 31 NEB. L. REV. 575 (1952).

85. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 191 (1902).
86. Thomson, The Dangers of Hypnotism, 9 WESTMINSTER REV. 624, 628
(1890).
87. WEITZENHOFFER, GENERAL TEcmHNQUE OF H NoTism 354-55 (1957).
88. Id. at 227-28.
89. MuNsTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND 204 (1930). "[H]ypnotism is not
without serious consequences and is therefore certainly not a plaything." On
the dangers of hypnosis see DUBOR, THE MYSTERIES oF HYPNOSIS 67-75 (1924).
90. The case is reported in Note, 31 Am. L. REV. 440 (1897).
91. Id. at 440.
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The scientists with only one dissent voiced an affirmative answer to
the question. The coroner's jury recommended that the state legislature pass a law prohibiting the practice of hypnotism.
In 1952 an English jury awarded $8,490 to a girl who charged that
as the result of hypnotism by defendant during a music-hall performance she went into a deep psychological depression that lasted almost
three years. In states which do not have statutes like those of Massachussetts
and Maine exempting hypnotists from the medical licensing laws, the
question has frequently arisen whether a person practicing hypnotism
or a similar form of mental suggestion is subject to these laws. The
Delaware court has held that under their statute requiring a license
for the "prescribing of remedies" the practice of mere hypnotism and
message, either alone or in combination, was not practicing medicine
within the licensing laws. 93 On the other hand, in an Indiana case a
"magnetic healer" was found to be subject to the licensing laws.9 4
Either by statute95 or court decision 96 many states have exempted
the practice of the tenets of any religion from the licensing laws
regardless of the degree of mental suggestion employed. The religious
practices, however, must be carried out in good faith and not as a
guise for a business undertaking. 97 It is not within the purview of
this paper to discuss the conflict between freedom of religion and the
police power of the state to define the practice of medicine, but it is
felt that there would be no constitutional barrier to bringing the
practice of hypnosis or other forms of mental suggestion within the
licensing laws.
Along the same lines, it is therefore submitted that the practice of
hypnosis, public or private, should be limited to a qualified group.
92. See Entrancing Trial, Time, Apr. 7, 1952, p. 31.
93. State v. Lawson, 65 Atl. 593 (Del. 1907).
94. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N.E. 862 (1902); accord, Smith v. State,
8 Ala. App. 352, 63 So. 28, aff'd, 183 Ala. 116, 63 So. 70 (1913) (mental suggestion); People v. Mulford, 140 App. Div. 716, 125 N.Y.S. 680, aff'd, 202 N.Y.

624, 96 N.E. 1125 (1910)

(suggestive therapeutics); State v. Pratt, 80 Wash.

96, 141 Pac. 318 (1914) (suggestive therapeutics).
95. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 91-5-17 (1953).

96. Bennett v. Ware, 4 Ga. App. 293, 61 S.E. 546 (1908). Five years later the
Georgia legislature enacted a typical religious exemption statute. "Nothing
in this Chapter [relating to the licensing of physicians] shall be construed to
prohibit .. .the practice of the religious tenets or general beliefs of any
church whatsoever . . . " GA. CODE ANN.§ 84-906. Tennessee does not have
such a broad exemption but does exempt the practice of Christian Science.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-608 (1956). Nebraska and Ohio have held the practice
of Christian Science treatment for a fee to be within the licensing laws. State
v. Buswell, 40 Neb. 158, 58 N.W. 728 (1894); State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21,
73 N.E. 1063 (1905).

97. Smith v. People, 51 Colo. 270, 117 Pac. 612 (1911); People v. Wendel,

68 N.Y.S.2d 267 (App. Div. 1946), aff'd, 272 App. Div. 1067, 75 N.Y.S.2d 302
(1947); State v.Pratt, 92 Wash.200, 158 Pac.981 (1916).
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This would certainly be difficult and at first rather arbitrary but
indeed desirable. Perhaps a good place to start would be to limit the
practice to physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and dentists. Once
the practice of hypnotism is limited to qualified persons, a privilege
to prevent the use as evidence of statements made to such persons
should be created. Finally, the law should forbid the hypnotism of
anyone without his consent, or the consent of his legal guardian,
whatever the purpose-experimental, therapeutic, or otherwise.
WILLIAM P. SWAIN"
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